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Patent Litigation in China:
Protecting Rights or the Local
Economy?
Brian J. Love*
ChristianHelmers**
Markus Eberhardt***
ABSTRACT

Though it lacked a patent system until 1985, China is now the
world leader in patent filings and litigation. Despite the meteoric rise
of the Chinese patent system, many in the West believe that it acts
primarily to facilitate local protectionism rather than innovation.
Recent high-profile patent suits filed by relatively unknown Chinese
firms against high-profile foreign tech companies, like Apple,
Samsung, and Dell, have only added fuel to the fire. Surprisingly,
given how commonplace assertions of Chinese protectionism are, little
empirical evidence exists to support them. This Article contributes to
the literature on this topic by analyzing five years of data (2006 to
2011) on patent suits litigated in courts with the fifty most active
intellectual property dockets in China. Among other things, we find
that Chinese patent suits are highly concentratedin a handful of major
urban jurisdictions-not in smaller inland cities where protectionism
is most often alleged to take place-and also have rates of success and
appeal very similar to those of US patent suits. We also observe that
foreign companies appear in Chinese patent suits most often as patent
enforcers, not as accused infringers, and win their cases roughly as
often as Chinese patentees. Finally, we find that patents litigated in
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China are generally more than five years old at the time of assertion
and frequently have family members issued by foreign patent offices.
Together, these findings contradict conventional wisdom that China's
patent system has been structured to benefit domestic industry at the
expense of foreign firms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, patent activity has exploded in China. Since
the mid-1990s, the number of patent applications filed annually with
China's State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) has increased more
than ninety-fold to a total of 928,177 in 2014,1 roughly 40 percent
more than the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
received that year. 2 China has also become the global leader in patent
litigation with 9,648 suits filed in 2014, 3 roughly 90 percent more than
4
the total number filed in the United States.

1.
State Intell. Prop. Off., Monthly Statistics Reports (Aug. 27, 2015),
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2014/12/201502/t20150204_1071538.html
[https://perma.cc/
CE36-R83S] (reporting that in 2014, a total of 928,177 "invention" patent applications were filed
in China). China, like most industrialized nations, recognizes three types of patents: invention
patents, design patents, and utility models, see DOUGLAS CLARK, PATENT LITIGATION IN CHINA 29
(2011); however, in legal parlance, the term "patent" is typically used to refer exclusively to
"invention" patents. We follow the same convention in this Article. All references infra to
"patents" are, unless otherwise indicated, references to "invention patents."
2.
Compare id. with U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., U.S. Patent Statistics Chart
Calendar Years
1963-2014
(Aug. 16, 2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/
oeip/taf/us-stat.htm [https://perma.cc/9GK4-VZHP] (reporting that in 2014, a total of 578,802
"utility" patent applications were filed in the United States).
3.
Supreme People's Court of China, IP Protection by Chinese Courts in 2014,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=371329 [https://perma.cc/X4VR-GTWF]; see also
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Little evidence, however, links China's patent boom to an
actual increase in innovation. 5 Rather, the rapid growth coincides
with a major government campaign designed to increase domestic
patent activity through incentives and political pressure. 6 In contrast
to American patent policymakers who have largely worked over the
past decade to rein in some of the US patent system's excesses, 7 the
Erin Coe, 5 Tips In The Art Of Patent War In China, LAW360 (May 29, 2014),
https://www.morganlewis.com/news/5-tips-in-the-art-of-patent-war-in-china-1aw360
[https://perma.ccIY7WT-DQZK] ("Chinese courts have seen patent cases more than double over a
four-year period, from 4,422 filings in 2009 to 9,680 suits in 2012 .... "); YAN ZHAO, CHINA'S
PATENT LITIGATION LANDSCAPE SHIFTS, DLA PIPER (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.dlapiper.com
en/us/insights/publications/2012/09/chinas-patent-litigation-landscape-shifts
[https://perma.cc/
KWA6-FXL8] (reporting that Chinese courts saw 7,819 new patent suits in 2011 and 5,785 in
2010). Though we were unable to obtain official statistics on the types of patents enforced in
these cases, anecdotal evidence suggests that less than half (and perhaps as few as one-fifth) of
these suits allege infringement of an invention patent. Hon. Zhou Yunchuan, Supreme People's
Court of the People's Republic of China, Remarks at the Law in the Global Marketplace
Conference at Santa Clara University School of Law (Nov. 4, 2015).
4.
Compare IP Protection by Chinese Courts in 2014, supra note 3, with Lex Machina
(March 21, 2016), https://lexmachina.com [https://perma.ccFCY2-MYYX (reporting that a total
of 5,070 patent suits were filed in the U.S. in 2014, 6,113 in 2013, 5,411 in 2012, 3,530 in 2011,
2,714 in 2010, and 2,502 in 2009); see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know:
Revealing the New China's Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773, 777-78 (2011)
(comparing the number of patent suits filed in China and the United States in 2006 and 2008).
5.
Many have questioned the quality of patents fueling China's patent explosion. See
Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 79 (reporting that in response to
government mandates, a "cottage industry has sprung up to produce patents of suspect value");
Markus Eberhardt, et al., What Can Explain the Chinese Patent Explosion?, CSAE Working
Paper WPS/2011-15, at *4, *17 (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1965963 [https://perma.cc/3QDB-HH6WI (finding that the growth of domestic patenting in China
is largely attributable to a small number of Chinese information technology (IT) equipment
manufacturers and thus "most likely not" a "wider technological take-off among Chinese
companies'); High Quantity, Low Quality: China's Patent Boom, WANT CHINA TIMES (June 24,
2014),
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1102&MainCatlD=11&id=
20140624000124 ("China's patent business is booming in terms of the number of applications,
but the quality of patents is still poor, according to a Monday report to the top legislature.").
6.
These enticements include cash payments, tax breaks, better housing, and, for
professors, increased credit toward tenure. Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, supra note 5, at 78.
Several recent studies link the growth in Chinese patenting to government subsidies like these
and resulting gamesmanship on the part of patentees. See Jianwei Dang & Kazuyuki Motohashi,
Patent Statistics:A Good Indicatorfor Innovation in China? Patent Subsidy ProgramImpacts on
Patent Quality, 35 CHINA ECON. REV. 137 (estimating that government subsidy programs inflate
Chinese patent counts by 30 percent); Zhen Lei et al., Patent Subsidy and Patent Filing in
China, Working Paper (2012) (finding that, after the institution of government subsidies,
Chinese patentees received the same number of patent claims, but spread those claims out over a
larger number of individual issued patents); see also Patent Fiction, ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21636100-are-ambitious-bureaucratsfomenting-or-feigning-innovation-patent-fiction [https://perma.cc/6B7Q-NU32] ("mhe explosion
of patent filings is not the result of local researchers suddenly coming up with twice as many
ingenious inventions: it is a response to a government order.").
7.
Since the mid-2000s, congressional interest in the US patent system has largely
focused on reforms designed to eliminate low quality patents and reduce the level of patent
litigation. After years of debate, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in
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Chinese government has been hard at work encouraging patent filings
and enforcement among its citizens. These efforts, formally embodied
in the China State Council's National Intellectual Property Strategy
("National IP Strategy"), have the stated goal of raising China's rank
"among the advanced countries of the world in terms of the annual
number of patents for inventions granted to ... domestic applicants"
and thereby "improv[ing] China's capacity to create, utilize, protect
and administer intellectual property" by 2020.8
Though the Chinese government insists that the goal of the
National IP Strategy is to "mak[e] China an innovative country,"9
many in the West contend that the practical impact-if not the true
goal-of the policy shift is protectionism and thinly-veiled piracy,
rather than innovation. According to a report prepared by the US
Chamber of Commerce and the Global Intellectual Property Center,
China's patent reform efforts are part of a "refocus on state-industry
monopolies" that is "increasingly perceived as anti-foreign" and
"considered by many international technology companies to be a
blueprint for technology theft on a scale the world has never seen
before." 10 Suggestions are commonplace, even from US policymakers,
2011. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in various sections of Title 35). Among
other reforms, the ALA established a suite of powerful administrative procedures for challenging
the validity of issued patents. See Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambawani, Inter Partes Review: An
Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014) (comparing the new regime of
"inter partes review" with the pre-AIA regime of "inter partes reexamination"). In the last two
terms, Congress has considered close to a dozen additional bills aimed at further reducing the
cost and prevalence of patent litigation. See Patent Progress's Guide to Federal Patent Reform
Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progresslegislation-guides/patent-progresss -guide-patent-reform-legislation/
[https://perma.ccIW7YKV75R] (summarizing patent reform bills introduced during the 113th and 114th Congresses).
8.
Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (2008) [hereinafter National
IP Strategy], http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/n/cn021en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JCEW34V].
9.
Id.
10.
CHINA
STRATEGY:
REFINING
YOURS
COULD
OPEN
UP
DOORS,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
LLP, 6 (2011),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/private-companyservices/publications/assets/gyb-63-china-strategies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9RY-A5MN]
("In
2010, surveys by both the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Shanghai and the USChina Business Council (USCBC) pointed to perceived protectionism, lack of protection for IP
rights, and struggles with the evolving regulatory environment."); JAMES MCGREGOR, CHINA'S
DRIVE FOR INDIGENOUS INNOVATION: A WEB OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES, ACPO WORLDWIDE, 4-5
(2010),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/100728chinareport-O.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W27P-94MX]; see also Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic
Development, and the China Puzzle, OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELL. PROP. L., at 34 (2007),
http://www.law.drake.edu/clinicsCenters/ip/docs/ipResearch-opl.pdf
[https://perma.ccY7QUZLW7] (noting that "[i]n China, the oft-cited barriers to intellectual property reforms include...
widespread corruption, abuse by government officials, different values placed on intellectual
property infringement, . . . local protectionism, and the decentralization of government.");
Andreas Bieberbach, IP Strategies in Business Operations with China, 9 J. BUS. CHEM. 161, 161
(2012), http://www.businesschemistry.org/downloads/issues/Issue10-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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that the patenting push is an attempt to whitewash and legitimize
what, in essence, remains a system built on piracy of foreign
inventions.11
Western complaints about China's patent surge generally take
two forms. First, many allege that Chinese patents simply crib
inventions previously made elsewhere. 12 Recent headline-grabbing
patent suits filed by relatively unknown Chinese firms against
high-profile foreign technology companies have added fuel to this
fire. 13 Apple has been sued for allegedly infringing Chinese patent
rights that cover virtual assistant Siri, video-telephony service
FaceTime, and aspects of the famously sleek designs of the iPod, iPad,
and iPhone. 14 Other household names, including Canon, Dell, Philips,

KCY7-ZXAZ] ("[S]ince 1984 .... Chinese Patent Law has been ... constantly adjusted to the
actual needs ... of... Chinese companies."); Danny Friedmann, China's National IP Strategy
2008, DUNCAN
BUCKNELL:
GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
STRATEGY
(2008),
http://duncanbucknell.com/2OO8/09/1 1/chinas-national- ipstrategy- 2008/ [https://perma.cc/GV8MVVT8] (noting the existence of "prevalent legal protectionism" in China); Mike Masnick, China's
Patent Strategy Isn't About Innovation; It's an Economic Weapon Against Foreign Companies,
TECH DIRT (Jan. 4, 2011), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110102/15230512491/chinaspatent-strategy-isnt-about-innovation-its-economic-weapon-against-foreign-companies.shtml
[https://perma.cc/9DLL-NGDW].
11.
See Teresa Stanek Rea, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property, Remarks at the Fordham Law School China Event (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2013/rea-fordham-china.jsp
[https://perma.cc/9Y7B-RPVJ]
("This massive growth presents unique problems for U.S. rights holders, who have complained
about patent quality .... [Clompanies that have filed for patent protection of pharmaceutical
compounds at SIPO have had their applications denied, while corresponding patent applications
in other patent offices, such as the Japan Patent Office, the Korean IP Office, the European
patent office, and others, have been granted. That is troublesome."); Lara Farrar, Can China
Become an Intellectual Property Powerhouse?, CNN (Feb. 15, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/
BUSINESS/02/14/china.intellectual.property/ [https://perma.cc/2EQU-RHB6] ('"[The Chinese]
say that if you don't come to China to file, you cannot accuse us of not respecting your own
intellectual property because you don't even care to go to the Chinese patent office."' (quoting
Tony Chen, a partner in Jones Day's Shanghai office)). For an example of Chinese firms' desire to
shed their reputation for piracy, see Bieberbach, supra note 10, at 161-62 ("I don't mind how
much [the accused infringer] pays us. What I care about is winning the case. It will help change
the stereotype that it is Chinese companies that are always accused in IPR cases." (quoting Nan
Cunhui, Chairman of Chint Group, a Chinese electronics company)).
12.
See Vivek Wadhwa, China Could Game the U.S. in Intellectual Property,
BUSINESSWEEK
(Jan.
10,
2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/technology/content/
jan2011/tc2011017_509416.htm [https:/perma.cc/AYD7-P9US] ("A vast number of China's
academic papers are plagiarized or irrelevant; its government-sponsored patents will be
similarly tainted."); Vivek Wadhwa, Let's Compete on Innovation Rather Than Patents,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 15, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/15flets-compete-on-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/A4H5-XU6K] (recounting an anecdote about a Chinese supplier patenting its
foreign customers' technology).
13.
See Chris Neumeyer, China's Great Leap Forward in Patents, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4,
2013),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/04/chinas-great-leap-forward-in-patents/id=38625/
[https://perma.cc/S8WQ-VUAF] (summarizing these suits).
14.
Id.
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Samsung, and Sony, have also been sued, losing multi-million dollar
15
verdicts in some instances.
Second, many contend that foreign companies cannot get a fair
shake in the Chinese judicial system and, thus, it would be a
Sisyphean endeavor for Western technology companies to engage the
16
Chinese patent system as a means of deterring infringement.
Warnings about "local protectionism," "bias," "corruption," and "lack of
impartiality"-especially in China's inland provinces-are ubiquitous
and go virtually unchallenged at the highest levels of government, the
17
legal profession, and academia.
However, given how strident and commonplace assertions like
these are, surprisingly little empirical evidence exists to support
them.1I Despite the meteoric rise of patent activity in China-and an
15.

Id.

16.
See Bieberbach, supra note 10 at 164 ("It is a 'common understanding' ...
that
western companies cannot enforce their IP rights in China because of the weak legal system in
China."); Rea, supra note 11 ("[R]ight holders continue to complain about China's civil judicial
enforcement system ....We have also heard about many cases of decisions being made based on
local protectionism and bias towards local companies ....");BENJAMIN BAI, IGNORE AT YOUR
OWN PERIL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP) STRATEGIES FOR CHINA, MARSH INSIGHTS:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2010), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/8f265dea-89c0-408d-

8b27-cc7a9b384340/Presentation/PublicationAttachment5d0c3d30-laf4-4436-b6ee-d4fc5
eea8768/intellectual%2OProperty%2OUpdate%20(Issue%202).pdf
[https://perma.cc/CG7MNSHM] ("[M]any multinational companies are reluctant to enforce their IP in China due to the
perceived lack of impartiality."); TINA E. HULSE, ET AL., BUILDING ASSETS FOR A BE'TER
TOMORROW, FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP, (Mar. 2008),
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=344b7O49-cc9f-43c3-99cddaedb90a9d01 [https://perma.ccF2Z9-QDCT] ("[E]nforcement may sound appealing at first, but
these procedures sometimes suffer from local protectionism and inadequate government
resources ..
");DEANNA WONG, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, HOGAN LOVELLS
5, 8 (2012), http://m.hoganlovells.com/

files[Publication/3126b99b-33dl-48a8-889e-6b3eaa821235/PresentationfPublicationAttachment
d9ef5385-4Obb-4fdO-99c5-6bflffd97cf4/Client-Note-Intellectual-Property-EnforcementinChinaChallenges andOpportunitie.PDF [https:/perma.cc/ZXS9-GB2G] (noting that 'local
protectionism is still prevalent in China, as is corruption" and that "[s]ometimes local
protectionism also enables losing parties to delay payment for years"); Richard P. Suttmeier &
Xiangkui Yao, China's IP Transition:Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights in a Rising China,
NATL BUREAU OF ASIAN RES. (2011), http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=520
[https:/perma.c/6C2P-YALV] (noting that "[mlany foreign companies have been reluctant to
pursue their rights in the Chinese legal setting .. ").
17.
See Bieberbach, supra note 10; Rea, supra note 11; BAI, supra note 16; HULSE ETAL.,
supra note 16; WONG, supra note 16; Suttmeier & Yao, supra note 16.
18.
Though some studies of Chinese litigation have found evidence of various biases, see
Cheryl Xiaoning Long & Jun Wang, JudicialLocal Protectionism in China:An Empirical Study
of IP Cases, 42 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 48 (2015) (finding that, in IP suits between Chinese firms,
plaintiffs litigating in their home towns are significantly more likely to win); Xin He & Yang Su,
Do the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead in Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMP. L. STUD. 120, 137 (2013)
(finding that, for example, government-owned companies are disproportionately likely to win
lawsuits); Xinyuan Chen & Oliver M. Rui, Judiciary Independence and The Enforcement of
Investor Protection Laws: Market Responses to the "1/15"Notice of the Supreme People's Court of
China, 9 CHINA ECON. Q. 1 (2009) (finding a correlation between firms' proximity to local courts
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apparent commitment by the Chinese government to sustain that

growth well into the future-Western scholars have paid relatively
little attention. Though a number of researchers (including two of us)
have begun to conduct large-scale studies of Chinese firm-level
innovation, 19 few in the West have attempted to collect and analyze
20
data on Chinese patent enforcement.

and their stock prices' response to announcement of a new cause of action), studies of IP
litigation in China have generally failed to find evidence of bias against foreign litigants, see
infra note 20. Outside the academic literature, various Chinese courts and other government
sources have also sporadically released statistics suggesting that there is no bias against foreign
litigants in IP suits. See, e.g, Chongqing EnterprisesResponding to ForeignIntellectual Property
Suits Won Less Than 6%, CHINA PATENT RIGHTS NETWORK, Jan. 14, 2015, http://www.prpcn.com/class21/70389.html [https:H/perma.cc/C89E-55RZ] (reporting that foreign litigants were
involved in thirty-one IP cases filed in Chongqing between 2003 and 2007 and that foreign
plaintiff's won 94 percent of their trials); Guangdong Higher People's Court, Guangdong Foreign,
Civil Cases Involving Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Intellectual Property Investigation Report,
Nov. 7, 2014 (reporting that foreign parties had a success rate of "about 70/o-80%" in 350 IP
2013),
and
early
between
2010
province
in
Guangdong
cases
filed
http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/ecdomain/framework/gdcourt/lgedihgbabbebboelkeboekheeldjmodjldi
njpmabbgbboelkeboekheeldj mod.do?isfloat= I&disp template=pchlilmiaebdbboeljehjhkjkkgjbjie&
fileid=20141107175435135&moduleIDPagejldinjpmabbgbboelkeboekheeldjmod&sitelDPage=gd
Shi
[https://perma.ccFC6R-6LST];
court&infoChecked=O&keyword=&dateFrom=&dateTo=
Qian, Zhejiang Foreign-RelatedIPR Cases Are Decided in Favor of Foreign Parties at a Rate of
95%, WEN WEI Po, Apr. 17, 2014, http://news.wenweipo.com/2014/04/17/NN1404170010.htm
[https://perma.cc/2YCR-LTHC] (reporting that foreign plaintiffs filed eighty-five IP suits in
Zhejiang Province in 2013 and won 95 percent of the time); Letter from Tian Lipu, Commissioner
SIPO, to David Kappos, Director USPTO (Sept. 27, 2012) (reporting that, in a study of eight
hundred Chinese patent suits filed in various provinces, foreign parties won more often than the
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/ip-overseas/china-team]
litigant),
average
CommissionerTians letter to MrKappos.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TFU-PJJ5]; Shanghai No. 2
Intermediate People's Court, 2006-2010 White Paper on Foreign-Related IPR Trials, Mar. 2011,
[https://perma.cc/LG56-CMT3] (reporting that
http://www.shezfy.com~book/bps/2010/p08.html
foreign parties a success rate of 86 percent in eighty IP cases litigated to a judgment in the court
between 2006 and 2010); Foreign-Related Intellectual Property Rights Cases Are Decided in
Favor of Foreign Parties at Rate of Over Half, CHINA NEWS, Dec. 2, 2010,
http://www.chinanews.com/fz/2010/12-02/2696176.shtml [https://perma.cc/JXL3-M373] (reporting
that foreign parties had a success rate of 55 percent in 2,691 IP cases litigated in Beijing No. 1
Intermediate Court between 2006 and 2010).
19.
See Markus Eberhardt, et al., What Can Explain the Chinese Patent Explosion?,
CSAE Working Paper WPS/2011-15, at *4, *17 (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1965963 [https://perma.cc/EX7P-DHDB].
20.
Only a handful of scholars have conducted empirical studies of Chinese patent
enforcement, and none appear to differentiate between enforcement of invention patents, design
patents, and utility models. Rongjie Lan, Are Intellectual Property Litigants Treated Fairer in
China's Courts? An EmpiricalStudy of Two Sample Courts, Indiana University Research Center
for Chinese Politics and Business Working Paper #16, at *24-26 (Jan. 1, 2012) (reporting
statistics for 668 patent cases (presumably involving all three types of patents) filed in two
unnamed Intermediate Courts between 2006 and 2010 and concluding that foreign parties win
=
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id
domestic
litigants),
just as
often
2169373 [https://perma.cc/3N2Z-9X5T]; Shenping Yang, Patent Enforcement in China, 4
LANDSLIDE 49, 49-50 (2011) (reporting statistics for eighty-eight adjudicated Chinese patent
cases (presumably involving all three types of patents) that included a foreign party and finding
that foreign parties won 60 percent of the time when litigating against a party from China),
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This Article contributes to the literature on this topic by
presenting the findings of an empirical study of patent litigation in
China. Among other things, we find evidence that Chinese patent
litigation is highly concentrated in a few large jurisdictions and has
rates of success and of appeal very similar to those seen in the United
States. 21 Most importantly, we also find evidence that contradicts
conventional wisdom about China's motivations for establishing, and
efforts to implement, the National IP Strategy. Though many suggest
China set out to create a system that would benefit domestic industry
at the expense of foreign firms, our findings suggest that the system
has accomplished the opposite. Contrary to conventional wisdom and
high-profile anecdotes, foreign litigants in Chinese patent suits play
the role of patentee more often than defendant and fare just as well in
their suits as privately owned Chinese firms. 22 Moreover, state-owned
monopolies-parties the Chinese government presumably has the
greatest incentive to protect-rarely sue and, when sued, lose a
23
significant share of their cases.
On the whole, our findings suggest that the Western
technology community may have been too quick to write off the
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/andslide-november-20 11/
yang-landslide novedec_2011.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/L649-DRF6]; Cheng Miao et
al., Theory and PracticeRelated to Patent Infringement Damages, CHINA PATS. & TRADEMARKS,
2009, no. 4, at 15 (reporting data on win rates and remedies for 594 decisions (involving all three
types of patents) issued by courts in five provinces in 2007 and 2008 and finding that foreign and
domestic patentees win their cases 71 percent and 73 percent of the time, respectively),
http://www.cpahkltd.comfUploadFiles/20100416101503234.Pdf
[https://perma.ccfUF7K-WPC2].
Commentators have also examined data on Chinese trademark enforcement, see Nathan W.
Snyder, Putting Numbers to Feelings: Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in China's
Courts: Evidence from Zhejiang Province Trademark Infringement Cases 2004-2009, 10 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 349, 361 (2012) (reporting statistics for 1,270 trademarks cases filed
between 2004 and 2009 in Zhejiang Province and finding that "[floreign companies are 4% more
likely to win cases that are adjudicated and 22% more likely to receive compensation from
winning adjudicated cases or entering mediated agreements"), as well as overall IP enforcement
in China, see Jin Haijun, Statistical Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights Classic Cases, 2015
INTELL. PROP. (BEIJING) 31, 37 (reporting statistics for 166 IP cases published in the Bulletin of
the People's Supreme Court of China, including that foreign parties were involved in thirty-three
suits
and
won
73
percent of the
time),
http://law.cssn.cnfx/fxzscqfx/201511/
t20151116_2595823.shtml [https://perma.cc/WET9-XY6L]; Long & Wang, supra note 18
(reporting statistics for a set of 102 IP cases published in the Bulletin of the People's Supreme
Court of China and a second set of 449 IP cases filed in five provinces between 1994 and 2009);
Alan J. Cox & Kristina Sepetys, Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Trends in
Litigation and Economic Damages, NERA Economic Consulting, at 20 (2009) (studying damages
awarded by Chinese courts in a sample of 179 IP cases between 2002 and 2008, and finding that
"the amount of the median award is not different when a Chinese firm is adverse to a foreign
firm,
regardless
of
which
firm
is
the
plaintiff"),
http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1330619 [https://perma.cc/X8R9-BND2].
21.
See infra Part IV.A.
22.
See infra Part IV.B.
23.
See infra Part IV.B.
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Chinese patent system as a rigged game. To the extent that Chinese
authorities sought to establish a protectionist system, they appear to
be failing. Rather, they seem to have opened the door for foreign
innovators to seek redress against local copyists. Industries that have
long accused Chinese firms of idea theft may be well advised to take a
24
peek inside.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the Chinese
patent litigation system.
Part III describes our data collection
methodology.
Part IV describes our findings, divided into
jurisdiction-, litigant-, and patent-specific findings. Finally, Part V
assesses what our findings suggest about the state of patent
enforcement in China, with a particular focus on whether the National
IP Strategy has lived up to its architects' expectations.

II. PATENT ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA
With almost a million patent applications filed in China last
year, it is hard to believe that the nation had no patent system until
1985. Originally passed by the National People's Congress in 1984,
the "Patent Law of the People's Republic of China" has been amended
three times-most recently in 2008-and is supplemented by, among
other sources, regulations promulgated by the State Council and
guidelines, measures, and "interpretations" issued by the Supreme
People's Court of China. 25 Because China is a civil law jurisdiction,
however, decisions of the Supreme People's Court (and all other courts
for that matter) in individual cases have little direct effect on Chinese
26
patent law.
Claims of infringement can be pursued and defended both
administratively and judicially.
In the administrative system,
challenges to the validity of issued patents are handled by SIPO's
Patent Review and Adjudication Board (PRAB). 27 In fact, because
Chinese patent suits are limited to the issue of infringement, the
28
PRAB is the sole venue of first instance for validity challenges.
24.
Limitations to our study include a lack of data on settled cases and a lack of data on
cases litigated after 2011. For more discussion of these limitations, see infra Part V.
25.
DOUGLAS CLARK, supra note 1, at 31-32; Yang, supra note 20, at 51-53. In addition,
China ratified the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1994. The PCT Now Has 148 ContractingStates,
WORLD

INTELL.

PROP.

ORG.

(Aug.

25,

2015),

http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/pct-contracting-

states.html [https://perma.cc/62YL-DVCWI (China ratified the TRIPS Agreement in 2001); China
and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
countries e/china e.htm [https://perma.cc/95U7-JVGY].
26.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 10.
27.
Id. at 13.
28.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 13. Thus, in this sense, China has a bifurcated system like
that in effect in Germany, which separates infringement and patent validity. See Katrin Cremers
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Allegations of infringement can also be brought to the attention of
local branches of SIPO, which are authorized to "order the infringer to
29
stop the infringing act" but are unable to award monetary damages.
If SIPO finds infringement or invalidity, its decision can be-and
frequently is-appealed to the court system. 30 As a result, most
serious cases eventually wind up in court.
With the exception of appeals from the PRAB, Chinese courts
are restricted to deciding the issue of infringement. 31 Chinese patent
suits involve relatively little discovery3 2 and proceed quickly, generally
33
reaching a decision on the merits six to eighteen months after filing.
In cases where infringement is shown, courts have broad power to
award remedies, including damages and both pre-trial and permanent
34
injunctions.
When infringement litigation proceeds in parallel with an
administrative validity challenge, courts may stay the case pending a
ruling by the PRAB but are not legally required to do so. 5 Because
validity proceedings usually take longer than infringement suits, it is
possible that a court will find infringement of a patent that is later
36
deemed invalid.
Judgments from lower courts can be appealed up through the
Chinese court system, which consists of four levels: (1) Basic People's
Courts, located in smaller cities and suburbs; (2) Intermediate
et al., Invalid But Infringed? An Analysis of Germany's Bifurcated Patent Litigation System 2
(Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 14-14)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2504507
[https://perma.cc/4CP3-K578]
(discussing Germany's bifurcated patent enforcement system).
29.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 21-22; Yang, supra note 20, at 50. SIPO can, however, help
the parties mediate a monetary settlement. Id. at 22, 25-26. A patentee can also enforce its
rights outside of court via the General Administration of Customs (GAC), which has the power to
seize infringing imports and exports. CLARK, supra note 1,at 27-28; Yang, supra note 20, at 51.
30.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 21.
31.
Appeals from PRAB are dealt with by the Beijing Fist Intermediate Court and can
then go to the Beijing Higher People's Court. Id. at 29.
32.
Id. at 105 ("[O]btaining evidence to prove infringement ... can be very difficult as
the Chinese court system only provides for very limited discovery [and] [t]here is no [automatic]
obligation on the parties involved in the litigation to disclose any information ...").
33.
See Yang, supra note 20, at 51 ("The normal term of a first instance [patent] case is
six months. In practice, once sued for infringing a patent, the defendant usually launches an
invalidation process . . . [that] usually takes one year .... Therefore, a patent infringement

litigation case in China generally takes 18 months.").
34.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 97-98, 151-52; see also Cox & Sepetys, supra note 20. The
Patent Law does not mention declarations of non-infringement as a potential remedy in patent
suits, but a 2010 interpretation by the Supreme Court permits declaratory judgment actions
when the patentee has sent a demand letter. CLARK, supra note 1, at 100-01.
35.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 102.
36.
A similar situation arises often in Germany. See Cremers et al., supra note 28, at 3
(estimating that 12 percent of German patent suits result in a finding of infringement of a patent
that is later invalidated by the Federal Patent Court).
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People's Courts, located in major cities; (3) High People's Courts,
located in each province, autonomous region, and directly controlled
city; and (4) the Supreme People's Court located in Beijing.3 7 Patent
suits-both infringement suits and appeals from PRAB-generally
begin in an Intermediate People's Court, though infringement cases
with sufficiently large amounts at stake may be filed in the first
instance in a Higher People's Court.38 The Supreme Court, all Higher
Courts, and many Intermediate Courts (at least seventy-six to date)
have established divisions that specialize in IP cases, including patent
39
suits.
III.

STUDY DESIGN

To learn more about patent litigation in China, we set out to
identify a large sample of patent suits litigated in recent years and
collect data on the courts, litigants, and patents involved. This Part
describes our data collection methodology.
A. Compiling a Database of Patent Suits
Though the number of patent suits filed in China has exploded
in recent years, relatively little information about Chinese patent
litigation is publicly available.
Chinese courts do not regularly
digitize filings-let alone make them publicly accessible online-so
those interested in collecting litigation data generally must
hand-collect hard copy files directly from local courthouses and
40
accumulate them for analysis.
One large collection of Chinese court records is the "China IP
Litigation Analysis" (CIELA) database created by the law firm
Rouse. 4 1 This source includes all Chinese IP suits litigated to at least
37.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 16-17, 85.
38.
Id. at 94. Patent cases in China must be filed in the jurisdiction of a defendant's
residence or where the infringing act occurred. Id. at 93. If more than one court has jurisdiction,
the patentee can select among them. Id.
39.
Id. at 94.
40.
This is beginning to change, however. With certain exceptions, Chinese courts are
now generally required to make judgments available online via a database administered by the
Supreme People's Court that was upgraded shortly before this Article's publication to allow
searches by cause of action and keyword. See Susan Finder, Supreme People's Court Upgrades its
Database, SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT MONITOR, Jan. 11, 2016, http://supremepeoplescourt
monitor.com/2016/01/11/supreme -peoples-court-upgrades-its-database/. The Supreme People's
Court also administers another online database of IP decisions known as "China IPR Judgments
and Decisions," http://ipr.court.gov.cn [https://perma.cc/A33N-7SK2] (last accessed March 21,
2016).
41.
See CIELA (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.ciela.cni/ [https://perma.cc/87UK-3EMT].
Darts IP is another well-known commercial source of Chinese court records from IP cases. Darts
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one decision issued by one of fifty courts with the most active IP
dockets in China, as well as all PRAB challenges proceeding in
42
parallel with those suits.
To assist in executing this study, Rouse graciously provided
access to CIELA data on all IP suits with a decision issued between
2006 and 2011. Of these suits, we were able to identify 471 that
43
included at least one claim for patent infringement.
B. Litigant-and Patent-Specific Data
For each of these 471 patent suits, we gathered a variety of
data relating to the suit's outcome and the parties and patents
involved. First, for each suit, we identified all litigating parties. 44 For
each litigating entity, we identified the location of its principal place of
business, the industry in which it operates, and whether it is a
privately or state-owned entity. We accumulated these firm-level data
from a number of sources, including the Chinese Annual Survey of
Industrial Enterprises and the Oriana and Qin databases, which
contain financial information for over 400,000 companies registered in
China. 45 Finally, for each suit, we identified the case's outcome,
including whether the case was appealed and, if so, whether the ruling
was affirmed or reversed.

IP, Solutions for You (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.darts-ip.com/patents/litigators/solutions-foryou/ [https://perma.cc/2HFX-F5PN].
42.
Id. The database covers the decisions of fifty "major IP courts" across thirty-one
cities and twelve provinces. Id. To be clear, some suits were appealed to one of these courts,
rather than filed there. There is very little publicly available data on Chinese suits that settled
without generating at least one court decision. Thus, a limitation of our study is that we cannot
observe the quantity or character of settled patent suits. The small amount of data that does
exist suggests that, while the majority of Chinese IP cases settle (roughly 65-85 percent), suits
involving foreign parties settle at a significantly lower rate. See Lan, supra note 20, at 13, 24-25
(finding an overall settlement rate of about 74 percent in a sample of 668 patent suits (involving
all three kinds of patents), but also that none of the thirty-six published cases involving foreign
parties settled); Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People's Court, supra note 18 (reporting that 51.4
percent of IP suits involving foreign parties settled, while the overall settlement rate in IP suits
was 62.8 percent); Snyder, supra note 20, at 363 (finding that 80 percent of trademark suits
involving foreign parties settled compared to 86 percent of suits between domestic litigants).
43.
Again, "patent" refers to "invention patent." See supra note 1.
44.
Party names were provided to us in Chinese characters, which we translated and
transcribed using translation software.
45.
Oriana, BUREAU VAN DIJK (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/ourproducts/company-information/international-products/oriana [https://perma.cc/U529-QGAY). Qin
is now exclusively available as part of the larger Orbis database. Id.
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Next, for each patent-in-suit, we identified the patent's priority
date, 46 technology classifications, 47 and, for patents with international
counterparts, the country where the application was initially filed. 48
IV. FINDINGS

In this Part, we report our findings with respect to patent
litigation filed in China by presenting the data broken down by
jurisdiction and by the characteristics of the litigants and patents
involved in each suit.
A. By Jurisdiction
Viewing the data first across jurisdictions, we observe that
Chinese patent litigation varies greatly by city in some respects and
yet, in others, is quite consistent. For one, we find that cases are
49
highly concentrated in a small number of jurisdictions (Figure 1).
Beijing alone is home to more than a quarter of all patent suits in our
database, 50 and the majority of cases take place in one of China's three
largest cities. 51 As a result, only twenty-two of the fifty most active IP
courts issued at least one patent decision per year during the period of
our study.

46.
As in the United States, the priority date for a Chinese patent is the filing date of
the patent's application or of the earliest relevant parent application to which it claims priority.
Compare CLARK, supra note 1, at 33-34, with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
47.
Specifically, we identified the patent's International Patent Classification number.
See International Patent Classification (7PC) Official Publication, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.
(Aug. 20, 2015), http://web2.wipo.int/ipcpub/ fhttps://perma.c/Z7BR-9HCZ].
China has been a member of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) since 1994. See
48.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 25. Using procedures established by the PCT, a patent
applicant can file a first application with a particular patent office and, within one year, file a
second "international" application to pursue patent rights in other nations that are PCT
members. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 1842 (9th ed. 2014).
The statistics reported for each jurisdiction include all cases in the database that
49.
were decided by courts located in that jurisdiction.
50.
Not even the infamous US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas can tout
this level of concentration during the same time period. Patent Cases Filed by Year, LEX
MACHINA (Aug. 25, 2015), https://law.lexmachina.com/court/table#Patent-tab [https://perma.cd
C94B-KWQG] (showing that, between 2005 and mid-2015, the Eastern District of Texas saw
about one quarter of all US patent suits filed in the top twenty most popular districts).
Again, to be clear, the data does not include settlement data, so we cannot
51.
accurately assess how many patent cases were filed in these courts. See supra note 24.
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Figure 1: Case Distribution by Jurisdiction.

jin ""

0GUangzhou
Notes: Size of bubbles corresponds to number of cases in each location.
cases displayed is 471. For case counts by location, see Table 1.
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Table 1: Case Counts, Appeals, and Outcomes by Jurisdiction.

Rank

Jurisdiction

No.
Cases

%Appealed

Final Outcome
% Not
Infringed

%Infringed

1

Beijing

123

63%

46%

54%

2

Guangzhou

88

84%

56%

44%

3

Shanghai

55

58%

73%

27%

4

Nanjing

31

74%

61%

39%

5

Changsha

28

14%

82%

18%

6

Hangzhou

22

64%

64%

36%

7

Chongqing

18

78%

67%

33%

8

Zhengzhou

15

40%

53%

47%

9

Fuzhou

10

50%

60%

40%

10

Ji'nan

10

90%

40%

60%

11

Kunming

10

40%

80%

20%

12

Chengdu

9

67%

44%

56%

13

Hefei

9

56%

44%

56%

14

Ningbo

9

33%

78%

22%

15

Shenyang

7

0%

43%

57%

27

19%

63%

37%

Other

Moreover, we find that cases are clustered by technology (Table
2).
Each of the three most active jurisdictions sees a
disproportionately large share of patent suits involving technologies in
one or more industries. The majority of all Chinese patent suits
related to both information technology and pharmaceuticals are filed
in Beijing. Shanghai is even more specialized, with almost 60 percent
of all patent suits related to automotive technology.
Similarly,
Guangzhou plays host to half of all patent suits related to
entertainment technology, a category that includes the toy industry.
Patent suits in the United States, by contrast, are not nearly as
clustered by industry, due in large measure to permissive venue rules
that draw many filings to plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions located far
from the geographic areas where industries themselves tend to be
52
grouped.

52.
See Jeanne C. Frommer, Patentography, 85 NYU L. REV. 1444, 1449, 1502, 1512,
1514, 1516 (2010) (finding that, among US district courts, none saw more than roughly 15
percent of any one of five broad technology classes and arguing that venue rules should be
changed to facilitate the industry-by-industry clustering of US patent suits in order to take
advantage of local expertise and court specialization).
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Despite this variation, however, three other data points appear
relatively constant across courts: success rates, appeal rates, and
remedies (Table 1). In eight of the ten courts that issued at least two
decisions per year, success rates were between 40 and 70 percent, a
smaller spread than that seen among US district courts.5 3 Similarly,
rates of appeal in six of the top seven jurisdictions fall between about
60 and 80 percent, rates that again are roughly similar to those seen
in US patent suits. 54 Moreover, remedies are quite consistent across
courts (Table 3).
Seven of the top eight jurisdictions have an
injunction grant rate of roughly 90 to 100 percent and a median
damages award between 80,000 and 150,000 RMB.

53.
See Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 407-09
(2010) (reporting that patentee win rates in US district courts varied between roughly 56 percent
and 12 percent among district with at least twenty-five decisions between 2000 and 2010).
54.
See 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
(2014)
http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigationstudy.pdf [https:H/perma.cc/7N6Q-CQWL] (reporting that between 2007 and 2011 "appeals were
lodged in over 70% of reviewed cases that reached an initial conclusion at the district court").
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Table 2: Share of Cases by Industry and Jurisdiction.
Industry
No. Cases
in Jurisdiction
Apparel &
Textiles
Automo
motive
Chemicals
&
Biotech
Entertent
tainment
Food
Fod &
Beverage

IT&e

Hangzhou

Naniina

Shanghai

Zhengzhou

Oth
-er

Tot
Cases

Chon-

iong
123

28

18

88

22

31

55

15

91

471

14%

0%

0%

0%

5%

10%

29%

0%

43%

21

0%

0%

0%

0%

13%

0%

63%

0%

25%

8

18%

3%

3%

15%

0%

12%

12%

18%

21%

34

0%

10%

0%

50%

10%

20%

0%

0%

10%

10

27%

0%

0%

7%

13%

%

0%

7%

40%

15

40%
57%

0%
0%

0%
7%

20%
14%

0%
0%

0%
0%

20%
7%

0%
0%

20%
14%

10
14

24%

8%

5%

23%

5%

6%

11%

3%

17%

320

100

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

2

59%

4

4

4

%

0%

7%

4%

0%

19%

27
5

II

Healthcare

going

Guangzhou

Bei-

7

Services
Manu-

facturing
Machinery
Others
Pharmaceutias
ceuticals
Publishing
&
Printing
Sports &
Recreation

0%
8
800

%

%

0%

0%

0%

20%

20%

20%

0%

40%

00

00

0%

00

00

00

00

200

1

5

Table 3: Remedies Awarded by Jurisdiction.

Permanent Injunctions
Jurisdiction

Damages Awarded

Costs Awarded

No.
Cases

Requests

Granted

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Beijing

57

93%

89%

611.2

150

8.7

0.4

Changsha

23

70%

65%

283.2

48

1.8

0

Chongqing

12

100%

100%

366.7

100

0

0

Guangzhou

49

100%

90%

114.2

100

2.6

0

Hangzhou

14

100%

93%

153.0

150

5.6

1.2

Nanjing

19

100%

89%

263.9

95

7.0

0

Shanghai

39

100%

100%

146.0

100

16.2

0

Zhengzhou

8

100%

100%

82.5

50

0

0

Other

53

100%

92%

1241.6

100

2.6

0

1

Notes: Amounts in RMB 1,000; Remedies data is unavailablefor two suits.
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B. By Litigant Characteristics
Turning to the litigants in our cases, we find that they are
diverse-both geographically and classified by industry-and yet
nonetheless fare consistently well in court decisions across these
classifications.
First, we find that, while Chinese patent cases are highly
concentrated in a small number of cities, litigants themselves are not
(Figure 2). Almost half of all litigants accused of infringement hail
from outside the largest five jurisdictions, as do the largest share of
patentees.
Also, while individual industries tend to cluster in individual
courts, litigants as a whole represent a diverse array of market sectors
(Table 4). Though companies in the mechanical engineering industry
constitute the vast majority of litigants, firms in the pharmaceutical,
chemical, and textile industries also make up a sizeable minority.
Figure 2: Litigants Categorized by Origin.
Defendant

Plaintiff

0

CL

0

-i
(Z

4
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Table 4: Case Distribution by Industry and Owner Type.
Industry
HMT

Ownership Type
Domestic
Private
Foreign
4

Domestic
State

Total

20

0

24

Apparel & Textiles

0

Automotive

0

1

7

1

9

Chemicals & Biotech

0

5

26

0

31

Entertainment

2

3

10

0

15

Food & Beverage

0

2

14

0

16

Healthcare

0

2

10

1

13

IT & Services

0

1

14

0

15

Mechanical Engineering

6

41

307

12

366

Others

0

0

2

0

2

Pharmaceuticals

0

8

26

1

35

Publishing & Printing

0

0

5

0

5

Sports & Recreation

0

0

5

0

5

Total

8

67

446

15

536

Notes: HMT represents Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.

Moreover, we find a substantial number of foreign entities
engaged in Chinese patent enforcement (Table 5). Though domestic
patentees filed the overwhelming majority of suits in our database,
foreign patentees initiated more than 10 percent of cases. In fact,
foreign entities appear in the data more often as patentees than
Foreign parties filed suit forty-nine times,
accused infringers.
winning thirty-five of them, and were sued just twenty-nine times. By
contrast, state-owned Chinese entities-often singled out as the
intended beneficiary of the Chinese protectionism 5 5-- filed just one suit
State-owned companies were accused of
in our database.
infringement much more often-fourteen times-and lost three of
those suits.
Finally, remedies awarded in the suits in the database are
surprisingly consistent across litigant types (Table 6). Successful
foreign patentees received a median damages award of 100,000 RMB
in suits against private Chinese firms, exactly the same amount that
private Chinese patentees received when they sued private domestic
parties. Interestingly, Chinese patentees received 20 percent less in
55.
See CLARK, supra note 1, at 5 ('Lawsuits brought against infringers where the
alleged infringer is a state-owned enterprise can be especially problematic. State-owned
enterprises usually have close relationships with local governments at the place where the
enterprises are located."); MCGREGOR, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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suits against foreign companies and 60 percent more in suits against
state monopolies. Similarly, foreign patentees received a permanent
injunction in every case they won, while victorious domestic patentees
were denied injunctions 5 to 10 percent of the time.
Table 5: Case Outcomes by Litigant Type.
Defendant

Foreign
Infr.
F rin
Forign

Infr.

No
Infr.

Infr.

No
Infr.

%

31

Infr.

)

(3

Infr.

1nfr.

(16')

Infr.

No
Infr.

HMT
Infr.

N
Infr.

, ,31

No

Private No'

Domestic

(4)

Domestic
StateOwned

Domestic
Private

N

22

4

I)

Infr.
Infr.-

Notes: IIMT represents Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.
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Table 6: Remedies by Foreign and Domestic Litigants.
Defendant
Foreign
Injunction
Plaintiff

No. Cases Inf. Found
________________

Requested
(Req'd)

100%

4100%

Foreign

Awarded
Awre

Domestic
Private

Damages
Req'd
Rq'
Mean:

Awarded
Aadd
Mean:

Median:

Median:

262.5
26.125

112.5

200

100

Mean:
1278.13

Mean:
386.94

Median:
475

Median:
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I
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Mean:
1299.14
Median:

Mean: 119.84
Median: 160

Foreign
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Private

300

Domestic
StateOwned
HMT

Note: Amounts in RMB 1,000; Remedies data is unavailable for two suits between
private domestic litigants; Infringement was not proven in any of the three suits filed
against litigantsfrom Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan.

C. By Patent Characteristics
Looking next at the individual patents asserted in our
database, we find them to be relatively international in origin,
relatively old when asserted, and disproportionately related to
mechanical and chemical inventions.
In addition, we see that
surprisingly few faced a validity challenge.
First, almost 30 percent of patents litigated in Chinese courts
were issued from applications initially filed in Europe, Japan, or the
United States (Figure 3). Another 4 percent, though originally filed in
China, were subsequently filed in other countries and have foreign
counterparts issued from patent offices located elsewhere in the world.
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Figure 3: Priority Filings by Country.
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Note: CA: Canada; CN: China; EU: European Union; JP: Japan; KR: Korea; and US: United
States.

Also, we observe that litigated patents are, on the whole,

roughly middle-aged, with a similar age distribution among patents
asserted by both foreign and domestic patentees. Only about 10
percent of patents litigated in Chinese courts were asserted within
five years of their priority date (Figure 4).56 Approximately 42
percent, by contrast, were filed more than a decade before they were
enforced in court.

56.
Patent applications pend, on average, between two and three years at SIPO before
they are granted. See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PATENTS 39 (2014), http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/ipstats/en/wipi2014/pdf/wipi2014patents.pdf [https://perma.cc/537G-KNCP]
(showing that patent pendency at SIPO decreased significantly from 2002 to 2010); Mark Liang,
Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Possible Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 478, 498 (2012).
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Figure 4: Patent Age at Time of Litigation.
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We additionally find that, consistent with the industry
distribution reported above, patents enforced by both foreign and
domestic parties mostly cover inventions related to the mechanical
and chemical arts. By comparison, US patent suits predominantly
involve electrical and computer- related technology. 57
Lastly, we find that a surprisingly small number of asserted
patents faced a parallel validity challenge. Overall, less than 14
percent of patents were challenged in a PRAB proceeding (Table 7).
By contrast, virtually every patent asserted in the United States faces
a validity challenge in court.58 Even relative to other jurisdictions that
bifurcate consideration of validity and infringement-a procedural
choice correlated with fewer validity challenges-this is a relatively
59
low rate of challenge.

See, e.g., Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a
57.
Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309,
1342-44 (2014) (finding that over 40 percent of litigated patent issued in the early 1990s cover
'"high tech" inventions).
58.
See Mark A. Lemely, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1502 (2001) ("Virtually every patent infringement lawsuit includes a claim that the patent
is either invalid or unenforceable due to inequitable conduct (or commonly both).").
59.
See Cremers et al., supra note 28, at 3 ("[Blifurcation reduces the likelihood that an
alleged infringer challenges a patent's validity . . . in particular [for] smaller firms . ....");
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Figure 5: Litigated Patents by Technology.
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Table 7: Validity Challenges by Nationality of Litigants.

Validity Challenged by Defendant?
Plaintiff

Defendant Foreign
No
No.
cases

Foreign
Domestic

Defendant Domestic

Yes
%

No.
cases

4

80%

15

83%

No
%

No.
cases

1

20%

3

17%

Yes
%

No.
cases

%

17

94%

1

6%

162

86%

27

14%

Notes: We were able to obtain data on parallel validity challenged for only 230 cases.

THOMAS COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES 362 (2013) (describing the "surprisingly low"
rate of PRAB challenges as "something of a puzzle" that "deffies] easy explanation").
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V. ANALYSIS

Overall, our findings suggest that Chinese patent litigation is
not rife with protectionism. To the contrary, they suggest that foreign
companies perform as well, if not better, than Chinese firms in patent
suits.
First, the case-level data suggests that patent suits are rarely
litigated in smaller inland cities where, conventional wisdom holds,
protectionism is most often encountered. 60 For one, our data indicates
that patent litigation is overwhelmingly a big-city phenomenon in
China and, even among major metropolitan areas, is largely
concentrated in just a few of the nation's largest cities. Moreover,
even when foreign companies are sued outside large cities, our data
suggests that it is relatively easy to move cases to urban jurisdictions
using the appeals process. 61 As our findings show, the rate of appeal
among Chinese patent suits is high, perhaps because Chinese patent
suits are fast enough and cheap enough to make appeal a realistic
option for most parties. 62 Last, large urban jurisdictions, particularly
Beijing and Guangzhou, seem to be the overwhelming venues of choice
for cases involving pharmaceuticals and information technology-the
technologies most often cited as targets of Chinese protectionism. 63
Together, these findings suggest that, even if protectionism is common
outside large cities, foreign patent litigants are not likely to face suit,
64
let alone a final court decision, in those jurisdictions.
60.
See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 1, at 4-5 ("In large cities, [protectionism] is usually not
a serious concern. In smaller cities, however, the local government will have strong incentives to
protect any opposing party that is a large employer of workers, and/or a large source of tax
revenue."); HULSE ET AL., supra note 16 ("mo the extent possible, IP owners should file civil
actions in the highest court possible in areas most experienced in handling infringement cases,
such as Beijing for patents or Shanghai for trademarks."); Bieberbach, supra note 10, at 161 ('"To
avoid local protectionism and have the case handled by an IP experienced court, the choice of the
right court is important (Beijing or Shanghai are recommended).").
61.
Consistent with conventional wisdom about the prevalence of bias outside large
urban areas, Long and Wang find that Chinese appellate courts are less likely than trial courts
to rule in favor of local parties. Supra note 18, at 48.
62.
Bifurcation of invalidity and infringement likely also creates an incentive for
appeal. See Cremers et al., supra note 28, at 11 (explaining that the German bifurcated system
incentivizes the appeal of infringement findings to delay their finality until the Federal Patent
Court can decide the issue of validity).
63.
See, e.g., MCGREGOR, supra note 10, at 4-5; Rea, supra note 11 (pointing to
pharmaceuticals in particular).
64.
Indeed, even domestic patentees appear to favor urban jurisdictions when filing
patent suits. As discussed above in Part IVA, a large percentage of patent cases litigated in
large urban jurisdictions are filed by domestic parties from outside those cities jurisdiction. The
fact that these parties very likely could have filed suit in their home jurisdiction, but chose not
to, suggests that even Chinese litigants generally prefer large urban jurisdictions to smaller
inland ones, despite the supposed benefits of local protectionism.
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Second, our observations about litigating parties also tend to
suggest that protectionism is not rampant in jurisdictions where
patent suits are commonly litigated. Foreign companies are not
frequent targets of Chinese patent suits and, to the contrary, most
often appear in our data as patent enforcers, not accused infringers.
Moreover, when foreign companies litigate to a decision on the merits,
they win relatively frequently and are awarded remedies
commensurate with those given to domestic patentees.
Chinese
companies-especially state-owned firms-fare worse on the merits of
their cases, both as plaintiffs and defendants, and when they litigate
against foreign companies, they actually receive less in damages than
they do in suits against domestic infringers.
Finally, the characteristics of litigated patents in our database
also tend to cast doubt on the broader Chinese patent system's
supposed protectionist tendencies. In a system rife with patents that
merely copy already-popular products, one would expect to see a large
population of suits asserted newly minted patents filed exclusively in
China. But the litigated patents in our data set are, on the whole,
relatively old, and many were issued from applications that are part of
international patent families. Just a tiny fraction of litigated patents
were asserted within five year of their issue date, and close to half
were more than a decade old at the time of suit. Moreover, about a
third have at least one foreign counterpart, which indicates that these
applications disclosed inventions deemed novel by at least one other
patent office. In addition, the most common technology class among
litigated patents is mechanical engineering, and the most common
industry classification among litigants is manufacturing. Electrical
engineering ranks fourth out of six patent categories, and information
technology ranks sixth on the list of represented industries. Thus,
though suits against Apple, Samsung, and Dell grab headlines in the
West, it appears that cases involving software and computer
technology constitute just a small minority of Chinese patent
enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall, these findings cast doubt on conventional wisdom
among Western companies and commentators about Chinese patent
enforcement. While we cannot rule out the existence of blatant
protectionism in smaller inland courts from which we could not obtain
data, patent suits in those jurisdictions appear to be rare. Moreover,
while we cannot observe settlement behavior or correct for other
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possible selection effects,6 5 our findings on litigation outcomes bear
little evidence of protectionism. Foreign patent owners brought over
10 percent of Chinese patent infringement actions in our database and
won over 70 percent of those cases.
By contrast, state-owned
entities-presumably those the Chinese government has the greatest
interest in protecting-filed only one suit in our database and lost
three of the fourteen suits filed against them. Lastly, while we cannot
rule out a rush to file and enforce shoddy patents in more recent
years, our findings cast doubt on claims that this was a regular
occurrence prior to 2012. Rather than a land rush to obtain and
enforce patent rights in the immediate aftermath of the National IP
Strategy's announcement, the vast majority of litigated patents in our
database were filed before the National IP Strategy was ever
announced, and many of those patents have family members blessed
by other nations' patent offices.
Accordingly, our findings tend to suggest that, to the extent
Chinese leaders hoped that stimulating the national patent system
would result in widespread protectionism, their hopes were misplaced.
To the contrary, they appear to have created a system that often
benefits foreign interests at the expense of domestic ones and that also
generates a good deal of litigation among domestic firms. Technology
companies in the United
States and elsewhere
in the
world-particularly those that have long accused China of
piracy-may be well advised to give the Chinese patent system a
second look.
Ultimately, however, this study is merely a starting point for
analysis of Chinese patent litigation and should be viewed as such.
We believe that the data presented in this Article is the best empirical
information on Chinese patent enforcement made available to date,
but we also acknowledge that it is imperfect in several respects. If
current trends in China continue, we expect to see the Chinese patent
system become more and more important to Western companies, law
firms, and policymakers. As demand for reliable information in this

65.
For example, it is possible that foreign tech companies, discouraged by conventional
wisdom about Chinese courts' supposed protectionist tendencies, bring suit only when their
claims are especially strong and, thus, litigate cases that are on average objectively more
meritorious than those filed by domestic patentees. It is also possible that foreign companies that
are willing and able to file suit in China (as well as those that are worth suing in China) are
generally more sophisticated or have deeper pockets than their Chinese counterparts and thus,
for example, are able to secure more skilled (or well connected) legal representation. Because we
lack the data to accurately measure and correct for these potential effects, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the success rates we observe among foreign litigants are, despite their similarity
to those of domestic parties, depressed by protectionism and, absent that disadvantage, would be
significantly higher.
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area increases, we expect data collection efforts to expand as well, and
we encourage future scholars to take advantage of this trend and
carry out future studies.

